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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff has standing to bring this appeal. Plaintiff brought this action, served or
failed to serve various parties and is in the best position to bring that matter to the
attention of the Court.
The attorney's fee affidavit is inadequate to support the award of fees made in this
case.
ARGUMENT
1. Defects in Service of Process are in the Record of the Lower Court.
The Plaintiff is the one that initiated this case and served such process as was
served in the case. The Plaintiff is the one in the best position to know and question
what was and was not done in serving process in this case.
There is no bright line test for establishing standing. The cases cited by
Defendant explain the policy and case by case analysis needed to determine if there is
standing. As the Utah Supreme Court has said in Terracor v. Utah Bd. Of State Lands,
716 P.2d 796, 798(1986):
The doctrine of standing is intended to assure the procedural
integrity of judicial adjudications by requiring taht the parties to a lawsuit
have a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute and sufficient
adverseness that the legal and factual issues which must be resolved will be
thoroughly explored. Unlike federal law where standing doctrine si related
to the "case or controversy" language of Article III of the United States
Constitution; our standing law arises from the general precepts of the
doctrine of separation of powers found in Article V of the Utah
1

Constitution. Under Utah law, the doctrine of standing operates as a
gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing in only those cases that are fit for
judicial resolution. Important jurisprudential considerations dictate that
courts confine themselves to resolution of those disputes most effectively
resoved through the judicial process, i.e., crystalized disputes concerning
specific factual situations. ... Thus, the doctrine of standing limits judicial
power so that there will not 'be a significant inroad on the representative
form of government, cast[ing] the courts in the role of supervising the
coordinate branches of government... [and converting] the judiciary into an
open forum for the resolution of political and idelogical disputes about the
performance of government.' ... For this reason, this Court will not lightly
dispense with the requirement that a litigant have a personal stake in the
outcome of a specific dispute. ... Nevertheless, it is difficult to make useful,
all-inclusive generalizations that determine whether standing exists in any
given case, since the issue often depends on the facts of each case."
(Citations omitted.)
Elsewhere the Utah Supreme Court observed that "At the outset, we note that
standing issues often turn on the facts of a case and that '[generalizations about standing
to sue are largely worthless as such.'" Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d
451, 453 (1985). The generalizations argued by Defendants in this case are
unpersuasive. The facts of this case demonstrate that Plaintiff not only has standing to
bring their appeal on the sufficiency of the lower Court's jurisdiction, the Plaintiff is
ideally situated to bring this issue to this Court's attention.
In this case, the facts which weigh against the Defendants' argument are as
follows: Plaintiff initiated this case and therefore it was the Plaintiff who served or failed
to serve process. Therefore, it is the Plaintiff who is in the best position to know what
deficiencies exist with the process which Plaintiff employed. Plaintiff's interests are
hostile to Defendants and Plaintiff is in an ideal position to advance that information
2

which is in Plaintiff's possession to prevent an error in this case. Plaintiff has been the
victim, in this case, of an earlier overlybroad judgment entered on this same property.
And earlier judgment which foreclosed all "Defendants" was determined to include
Plaintiff's interest despite the fact that Plaintiff had not been served in that case.
Therefore, Plaintiff has first hand experience in having rights with respect to this very
property forfeited as a consequence of sloppily drafted orders.
Beyond the named parties in this action, Plaintiff did not name all potential
claimants who may have interests in the property. The list of Defendants in this case
were taken from a title report used in drafting the initial complaint. After filing this case
Plaintiff learned that there were other interests also claiming against this property. These
other parties were never added to this litigation. One of those other interests arose out of
a tax sale1. That interest was deeded to TWN, an entity which is both friendly to
Plaintiff2 and currently litigating its claim in the Fourth District Court. An overly broad
order in this case, despite the fact that the TWN interest was never included in this
action, could potentially affect the outcome of the Fourth District Court. And, after the
entry of the overly broad judgment here, the Defendants have in fact attempted to make
such use of the judgment in that case. Since TWN was not named in this action, TWN
cannot challenge the overly broad language used by Defendants in their draft of the
l

This created a different root of title, and is an interest which was not named and
therefore should not be affected by this action.
2

Plaintiff and TWN are in privity of contract.
3

lower Court's judgment. Accordingly, if Plaintiff cannot present this matter here, it will
require further litigation in order to correct the problem in a cascading continuance of ongoing litigation.
Plaintiff is in the best position to raise the question of the sufficiency of process
since Plaintiff is in the unique position to inform the court as to what was done and not
done. Plaintiff has an interest in seeing to it that a correct and proper judgment is entered
in the case which Plaintiff initiated. Further, Plaintiff has an interest in the outcome of
the TWN interest which was not named here. Plaintiff wants to protect that interest
against any form of an overly broad judgment and misapplication of the proceeding
below. The TWN interest is the subject of a currently pending Fourth District Court case
in which the trial court there found that Defendants Michel have no interest. Nothing in
the lower proceeding here should affect that, but an overly broad form of judgment may
be used to attempt such an end. Plaintiff has that kind of interest to protect which will
assure the Court that there is a "sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute and
sufficient adverseness that the legal and factual issues which must be resolved will be
thoroughly explored." Terracor, supra. Further, as an officer of the Court, Plaintiff's
counsel is under an obligation to point out the defect to the Court so as to avoid plain
error in the case.
As to the argument that the Plaintiff bears the burden of challenging the propriety
of the lower Court's jurisdiction, it is the state of the record in this case that the failure of
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service of process was not challenged by Defendants below. The objection to the
overly broad order pointed out that there was a failure to serve the named parties. The
Defendant did not contest that. Rather, Defendants asked the Court to sign the order
anyway. The lower Court also assumed there had been an insufficiency of service, but
proceeded with the order anyway. Now, for the first time on appeal, the Defendants
claim through innuendo only, that there was no basis for such a conclusion in the record.
However, the affidavits of service in this case, when compared with the case caption,
demonstrates that not all parties were served.
2. Defects in Affidavit of Attorney Fees.
The purpose of Rule 4-505, Code of Judicial Administration, is to allow an
intelligent challenge to the award of fees. The affidavit does not allow such an
intelligent examination or challenge for the claimed fees to be made. The affidavit is,
however, facially subject to objection.
The entry of 4-30-98 for "53.4" hours means nothing. Is this a claim for 53.4
hours of work on that date? If so, there are not that many hours in the day and it is
patently inappropriate. What was done for these 53.4 hours? Was it related to the work
on this case? Was it a reasonable time to bill for the alleged work done? Does it include
30 hours for writing a one-sentence letter? What was done, if anything at all? How can
Plaintiff make a challenge to the reasonableness of the charge with such lack of
information? More importantly, how can the lower Court conclude the charge is
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reasonable with such lack of information? Yet that is all Plaintiffs were given and that is
all the lower Court had. Under these circumstances, the lower Court erred and should
have required a more sound basis to be established before making the award.
Respondent's brief observes that there is a lack of information in the record to
support the question of attorney's fees for this appeal. That is not because Appellant has
failed to support this appeal. Appellant has provided everything there is to this Court. It
is rather because after presenting all there is, there just is no support for any award of
attorney's fees in this case.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The Appellate Court should remand this case to the lower Court instructing it to
modify and limit the judgment it enters to parties before it. It should further instruct the
lower Court to require an adequate affidavit of attorney's fees to be submitted before
entering an award of attorney's fees.
DATED this

2-1

day of March, 2001.

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN
/ /

, ' / .

Denver (t. ^iwftrj Jr.
Xfforney for Plaintiff
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